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ARGUMENTS - PART 1: PETITIONER'S ORIGINAL ISSUES.
1. The Fabricated 1971 CC&R's are invalid under the Utah Statute of
Frauds because they were not "subscribed."
Respondent/Appellee concedes that the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's were
created by taking the Original 1971 CC&R's and altering the property
description.1 Respondent claims that they were fabricated by Deseret Diversified,
but nothing in the record shows who was responsible. Respondent argues that the
alteration is valid because it was "obviously corrective"2 without mentioning the
statutory requirement that a document must be "subscribed"3 to be valid.
Respondent would have this Court hold that a valid deed can be created by
taking an existing deed, changing the property description, and recording the
altered deed without having it subscribed by the grantor so long as it is "obviously
corrective." Petitioner replies there is no statutory exception for deeds that are
"obviously corrective" and the Perkins case4 expressly holds that a deed must be
complete before it can be "subscribed".
1

Respondent/Appellee's Brief, p. 27, lines 6 - 19.

2

Id., p. 27, line 9.

3

Utah Code Ann. sec. 2 5 - 5 - 1 (1998) ("Utah Statute of Frauds").

4

Utah State Building & Loan Ass'n v. Perkins, 53 Utah 474,173 P. 950
(1918), discussed in Petitioner/Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 23 - 24.
6

There are strong policy reasons for this Court requiring a subscribed
corrective deed in accordance with the 2002 Utah Supreme Court decision in
Arnold Industries.5 First, a corrective deed assures that the original grantor agrees
there was a mistake. Under Respondent's "obviously corrective" test, the grantee
alone can "correct" a property description and record the altered deed without the
grantor even knowing about it. Secondly, a corrective deed makes it clear that the
original deed is no longer effective. This prevents situations like that in mis case
where the Original 1971 CC&R's still encumber the southern half of the section
where the Summit County Justice Center is located. Thirdly, the "obviously
corrective" test cannot be applied consistently in the marketplace. The law of
deeds is applied in the marketplace by buyers and sellers. They can consistently
apply the statutory bright line test of subscription, but reasonable buyers and
sellers may disagree on whether a fabricated deed is "obviously corrective."
Finally, the "obviously corrective" test will invite the fraudulent alteration of
deeds, as pointed out by Petitioner in its opening brief.
2. Descriptio personae applies because the extrinsic evidence does not
prove that a trust existed in 1965 and that Deseret Diversified was its

5

Arnold Industries v. Love, 2002 UT 133,62 P.3d. 721. Cited in
Petitioner/Appellant's Opening Brief p. 25.
7

beneficiary in 1971.
Petitioner and Respondent agree that under the doctrine of descriptio
personae the word "trustee" must be disregarded in the 1965 Bates Deed unless
the extrinsic evidence shows there actually was a trust in 1965 and that Desert
Diversified was its beneficiary in 1971.
The most compelling extrinsic evidence that Desert Diversified was not the
trust beneficiary is that it did not exist in 1965 when the Bates deeded the land to
"Security Title Company, Trustee." Deseret Diversified was not incorporated until
March 18,1971, five and a half years later. If there were a trust, Deseret
Diversified could not have been its beneficiary. At the other end of the time scale,
after Deseret Diversified was dissolved in September 19746, Security Title
continued to execute documents using the word "trustee" after its name.7 Again,
Deseret Diversified could not have been the beneficiary.
The trial court ignored that evidence without explanation and relied on the
following "evidence" to hold as a matter of law that a trust existed and that
Deseret Diversified was its beneficiary:
6

The certificate of dissolution is in the record at R-00295.

7

For example, the Plats for Pine Meadow Ranch Plats "E,"" F,"" G" and
"I," which Security Title executed in 1987, in the record of the companion Peters
case at R-0444- 0451.
8

(1) The fact that the grantee was "Security Title" because, the trial court
reasoned, "a title company often holds title to property as trustee."8
The trial court confused two types of "trustees" - (1) a trustee under a trust
deed and (2) a classic trustee who possesses and manages property for the benefit
of a beneficiary. All title companies hold title to property as trustees under trust
deeds. In this role they hold title as security for the beneficiary (the lender) while
the trustor (the debtor) possesses and manages the property. But, a title company
cannot lawfully possess and manage property for the benefit of another person
because this would be conducting "trust business," and title companies are not
allowed to conduct "trust business."9 The 1965 Bates Deed is a warranty deed, not
a trust deed, so if there really were a trust, Security Title would have been
conducting trust business. In any case, there is no judicially recognized exception
from descriptio personae for grantees who "often" act as classic trustees.

8

Trial Court's Ruling and Order of March 22,2004, p. 13, R.00378. A
copy of the Ruling and Order is attached as Addendum Document "13."
9

Compare Utah Code Ann. sec. 7 - 5 - 1 et seq. (1999)(2004 Pocket Part)
dealing with who can conduct "trust business, with Utah Code Ann. sec. 57 - 1 21 (2000) dealing with who can be a trustee under a deed of trust. In 1965 there
was no statutory prohibition on a title company conducting "trust business," but
the "fact" that title companies were routinely conducting trust business in 1965 is
beyond the scope of judicial notice under Utah Rule of Evidence 201(b) (facts
"generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court").
9

The trial court also relied on what it called the fact that "the recorded plat
map reflected Deseret [Diversified] as the owner of the property and Security Title
as trustee." 10 (Bold faced emphasis added).
The trial court's "fact" is simply not true. The owner's dedication on the
plat does not describe Desert Diversified as the owner. It expressly says there are
four owners without saying what their respective interests are. The word "trustee"
appears only as part of Security Title's name, but the owner's dedication on the
plat expressly describes it as one of four "owners." The trial court treats the word
"trustee" in the name "Security Title Company, trustee" as extrinsic evidence that
a trust actually existed. But, whenever the word "trustee" appears as part of a
name, it is not "extrinsic." "Extrinsic evidence" means evidence other than use of
the word trustee as part of a name. The law presumes that the use of the word
"trustee" as part of a name is merely descriptive.
Actually, the evidence of the plat tends to show that Deseret Diversified was
not a trust beneficiary. It tends to show that Deseret Diversified had (or expected
to have) a direct ownership interest in the streets.
(3) Finally, the trial court treated as evidence the fact that Deseret said it

Ruling and Order p. 13, addendum doc. "13."
10

was the owner in the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's.11 The major flaw in the trial
court's reasoning is thinking that "owner" and "trust beneficiary" are the same
thing. They are not. The trustee is the "owner" of the assets held in trust both in
law and in popular speech. The beneficiary does not have possession and power
of disposition, the chief elements of ownership. If Deseret Diversified had
actually been a trust beneficiary, it would have said so.
Another flaw in the trial court's reasoning is ignoring the element of time.
The Fabricated 1971 CC&R's were recorded on August 19,1971. It is on that
date that Respondent must prove by extrinsic evidence that Deseret was the trust
beneficiary. The Plat was recorded a year later on August 9,1972. The plat is not
competent evidence of the state of title a year earlier.
Finally, the trial court ignored the element of space. The Fabricated 1971
CC&R's cover the south half of section 22, TIN, R4E, SLB&M. The plat does
not cover this area, but only a part of it, and the plat spreads out into section 21
and the north half of section 22. Was Deseret Diversified the trust beneficiary
with respect to the land covered by the plat or with respect to the south half of
section 22? If it owned the land covered by the plat, why did it try to impose the
Fabricated 1971 CC&R's on the land in the south half of section 21 not covered
11

Ruling and Order p. 13, addendum doc. "13."
11

by the plat?
3. Respondent does not show how a trust beneficiary can be in privity
of estate with a successor in interest to the trustee.
In its Opening Brief, Petitioner shows that a trust beneficiary is not in
"privity of estate" with the trustee's successors in title. Respondent tries to
counter this point by denying that Security Title held the land in question in fee
simple estate.12 This is contrary to Utah statutory law. The 1965 Bates Deed is a
warranty deed. By statute, the effect of a warranty deed is to convey the land in
fee simple to the grantee.13 Whether the grantee is a trustee or not makes no
difference under the statute. It follows that Security Title held the only "estate" in
the land - the fee simple estate - and Deseret Diversified could not be in "privity
of estate" with anyone.
4. Respondent has no answer for Petitioner's point that a trust
beneficiary has no power to dispose of assets held in trust.
An essential step in the reasoning of the trial court was its holding that a
trust beneficiary has the power to impose CC&R's on the real property held for its

12

Respondent/Appellee's Brief, p. 38, lines 1-2: "Security Title did not
hold title in fee simple,
"
13

Utah Code Ann. sec. 57-1-12 (2000) ("Form of warranty deed - Effect").
12

benefit in trust. In Petitioner's opening brief, Petitioner shows that a trust
beneficiary has no such power under Utah's general law of trusts.
Respondent deals with Petitioner's point in a footnote14 by pretending that
the Capital Assets decision15 holds that a beneficiary has such a power.
Respondent must be counting on this Court not actually reading the Capital Assets
decision. It has nothing to do with the powers of trust beneficiaries. It holds that
under the Utah Judgment Lien Act a judgment against a trustee is not a statutory
lien against the property held by the trustee in trust.
In the footnote the Respondent pretends that the consequences of this Court
holding that a trust beneficiary has a power of disposition of the assets held in
trust (the "parade of horribles") will not occur because the issue in this case is
whether Deseret Financial is the "owner" of the property. Respondent could not
be more wrong. What would cause the parade of horribles is for this Court to hold
there is no difference between "owner" and "trust beneficiary." If this Court does
not make any distinction between "owner" and "trust beneficiary," then neither
will people who deal with the beneficiary, the bankruptcy trustees and the IRS.

14

Respondent's Brief, p. 33, n. 13.

15

Capital Assets Financial Services v. Maxwell, 994 P.2d 201 (Utah 2000),
cited in Respondent/Appellee's Brief, p. 33, n. 13.
13

5. No court would accept Respondent's argument that the doctrine of
uniformity does not require that CC&R's be reasonably uniform over a given
subdivision (but only over whatever property they cover), because it would
defeat the purpose of the doctrine.
In Petitioner's opening brief, it shows that the various CC&R's do not cover
Forest Meadow Plat D subdivision in a reasonably uniform manner. The western
portion of the subdivision is purportedly covered by the 1973 CC&R's (which
appear to have been intended for the Pine Meadows Subdivisions), the
northeastern portion of the subdivision is covered by no CC&R's at all, and the
southeastern portion by the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's, splitting Petitioner's lot.
In response, Respondent argues that the doctrine of uniformity only requires
uniformity over whatever land happens to be covered by a given set of CC&R's,
not uniformity over a given subdivision.
No court would accept Respondent's argument because it would defeat the
purpose of the doctrine - to assure that all the lots in a subdivision are treated
fairly. Under Respondent's rule, a subdivision could be made subject to unfairly
non-uniform CC&R's by the simple expedient of using multiple CC&R's each
covering a different portion of the subdivision. For example, in this case it is
unfair for money collected from the subdivision lot owners in the western portion
14

of the subdivision which is purportedly covered by the 1973 CC&R's (which
provide for annual maintenance assessments made by lot)16 to be used for the
benefit of the lots in the southeastern portion which is purportedly covered by the
Fabricated 1971 CC&R's (which provide only for assessments for capital
improvements by acreage as opposed to by lot)17 and for the benefit of the lots in
the northeastern portion which are subject to no assessments at all because they
are covered by no CC&R's at all.
Respondent tries to meet this point by saying that "the Association's
assessments are uniform throughout the various Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow
Subdivisions."18 Hold on a minute. Respondent is asking this Court to validate
the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's while at the same time it is admitting that it is not
honoring them. Respondent knows that the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's do not
provide for annual maintenance assessments made by lot, and it knows it has no
right to make assessments on the lots in the northeastern portion of the
subdivision. But, it is using the 1980 Notice of Lien to justify its making annual

16

1973 CC&R's pp. 4 - 8, in companion Peters case, addendum doc. "3."

17

Fabricated 1971 CC&R's, p. 3, para. 3, addendum doc. "4."

18

Respondent/Appellee's Brief, p. 42, lines 18-19; also p. 13, line 20 to
p. 14, line 2.
15

maintenance assessments against all the lots.
PART 2: RESPONDENT'S NEW ISSUES.
Respondent raises four new issues in its brief. In this part, Petitioner
responds to Respondent's arguments with respect to those new issues.
6. Petitioner Forest Meadow has standing to challenge the Fabricated
1971 CC&R's and the 1980 Notice of Lien because the fact that it had
constructive and actual notice does not diminish the rights it received from its
grantor.
Respondent argues that Petitioner cannot challenge the 1971 CC&R's and
the 1980 Notice of Lien because it bought the lot with actual and constructive
notice of them. Respondent points to the language in the deeds in Petitioner's
chain of title that conveys the lot "subject to easements, restrictions and rights of
way currently of record, and general property taxes for the year 1996 and
thereafter."19 Respondent also points to Mr. Peter's affidavit where Mr. Peters
(Petitioner's attorney at the time) admits that he knew of the 1971 CC&R's and
the 1980 Notice of Lien when Petitioner bought the lot. Respondent asks this
Court to hold that the effect of buying land with notice of a wrongful lien is to

19

Quoted from the 1998 deed from Liftos to Grabowski, addendum doc. "9"
in Petitioner's Opening Brief.
16

validate the lien because the purchaser with notice will have no "standing" to
challenge the wrongful lien.
By statute, the effect of the "subject to" language in warranty deeds is only
to limit the covenants given by the grantor.20 By that same statute, the grantor
transfers to the grantee "the premises therein named together with all the
appurtenances, rights, and privileges thereunto pertaining." One of those rights, of
course, is the grantor's right to challenge wrongful liens.
The question of the meaning of the "subject to" clause in a warranty deed
was decided by the Utah Supreme Court in 1990 in Hancock v. Planned
Development Corp.. A grantor conveyed land to Hancock by a deed that provided
it was "subject to the fence line encroachment along the east line." This referred
to land within the deed's property description but east of a fence. The land east of
the fence was in the possession of Planned Development. Hancock sued Planned
Development to clear title to that land. The trial court held that the grantor had
not conveyed the land east of the fence to Hancock, interpreting the "subject to"
clause as a reservation of ownership by the grantor. Hancock appealed. Planned
Development did not argue that the effect of the "subject to" clause was to deny

20

Utah Code Ann. sec. 5 7 - 1 - 1 2 (2000) ("Form of warranty deed -

Effect").
17

Hancock "standing" to challenge its rights, but defended on the grounds of
boundary by acquiescence. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court and
held that under the statute the only effect of the "subject to" language in a
warranty deed was to limit the covenants given by the grantor. The Court held
that under the statute the effect of the warranty deed was to convey all grantor's
rights in the land covered by the property description to Hancock.
It is true that the Utah Supreme Court did not expressly consider
Respondent's "standing" argument in Hancock, but the issue was raised by the
facts and implicitly rejected. Hancock was permitted to challenge Planned
Development's claims.
If this Court adopts the standing rule advocated by Respondent, conveying
property subject to a wrongful lien by warranty deed will have the effect of
validating the wrongful lien. The reason is that a clause similar to "subject to
encumbrances of record and the lien of current and future taxes not yet due and
payable" appears in virtually every warranty deed. Without this clause, by statute
the grantor covenants against any and all liens and encumbrances whatsoever
(whether of record or not). But, the same statute provides that "any exceptions to
these covenants may be briefly inserted in the deed following the description of

18

the land."21 So, competent drafters always "insert" the "subject to" clause after
the property description.
Under the same statute, a warranty deed has the effect of the grantor
transferring to the grantee the right to challenge any lien or encumbrance, rightful
or wrongful lien, of record or not of record, known or unknown, as illustrated by
the Hancock decision. This means grantees may safely ignore wrongful liens if
they think challenging them is not worth the expense of litigation. For example, in
this case Respondent's rights, if any, under the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's were
moot until the year 2000 because the Special Service District was providing all the
area services and Respondent was not making any assessments.
7. The presumption of correctness for statements of fact in recorded
documents provided by Utah Code Ann. sec. 57-4a -4 (1) (j) does not apply to
claims of ownership because ownership is not a "fact" within the meaning of
the statute.
Respondent argues that because Deseret Diversified says it is the owner of
the property covered by the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's, a recorded document, under
the presumption of Utah Code Ann. sec. 57-4a-4(l)(j), this Court must hold that

21

Utah Code Ann. sec. 5 7 - 1 - 1 2 (2000) ("Form of warranty deed -

Effect").
19

Deseret Diversified was the owner unless Petitioner proves otherwise by "clear
and convincing evidence." Section 57-4a-4(l)(j) creates a presumption that
"recitals and other statements of fact in a [recorded] document including without
limitation recitals concerning mergers or name changes of organizations are true."
Petitioner replies that the legislature never intended the statutory
presumption to apply to claims of ownership, but only the sort of "facts" of the
sort illustrated by the statute (facts as to mergers or name changes of
organizations, etc.). Changes of ownership are made by recorded deed so they
automatically appear in the record. There is no need for a presumption. But, name
changes are not automatically recorded. A presumption is needed.
Petitioner also replies that "owner" is not the same thing as "trust
beneficiary" at law or in popular speech. If Deseret Diversified had declared in
the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's that it was the beneficiary of the trust established by
the 1965 Bates Deed, its declaration would be relevant. But, it declared it was the
"owner." Deseret Diversified's declaration of ownership is evidence it was not a
trust beneficiary. If it had been a trust beneficiary, it would have said so.
The consequences of this Court interpreting Utah Code Ann. sec. 57-4a-4
(1)0) to apply to claims of ownership would be that no record owner would be
secure. Any stranger could record a document stating the "fact" that it was the
20

true owner of the property and put the record owner to the demanding test of
proving ownership by clear and convincing evidence. The lot owners in the area
covered by the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's would be the first to feel those
consequences. They may have lost their land to whoever is the successor in
interest to Deseret Diversified, the presumed owner22 under Respondent's test.
8. The 1980 Notice of Lien is a statutory "wrongful lien" because at the
time it was recorded it was not signed by the then owner of the real property
-Security Title.
Respondent argues that the 1980 Notice of Lien is not a statutory wrongful
lien as to Petitioner because Petitioner did not own the lot at the time the 1980
Notice of Lien was recorded. Respondent must be counting on this Court not
actually reading the statute. The statutory definition of a wrongful lien is "any
document that purports to create a lien or encumbrance on an owners interest in
certain real property and at the time it is recorded or filed is not: . .

. (c)

signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the real

22

The trial court prevented this consequence by holding that since Deseret
Diversified was a trust beneficiary, Security Title as trustee had the power to
convey the property free of Deseret Diversified's beneficial interest. See Utah
Code Ann. sec. 75 - 7 - 816 (1) (1993)(2004 pocket part) (enacted by L, 2004, ch.
89, sec. 97, eff. July 1,2004) and its predecessor, Utah Code Ann. sec. 75 - 7 - 406
enacted by L. 1975, ch. 150, sec. 8).
21

property.'

The relevant owner is the owner "at the time the document is

recorded or filed." In contrast, the statute provides that the petitioner must be a
person "who possesses a present, lawful property interest" in the property.24
The consequence of this Court holding that only people who own property
at the time the wrongful lien is filed may use the remedies provided by the Utah
Wrongful Lien Act would be to defeat the legislative purpose of providing a
speedy, summary method to get rid of wrongful liens.
9. The 1980 Notice of Lien is a statutory wrongful lien because it
purports to create a new lien, not merely to republish the lien of the
Fabricated 1971 CC&R's.
Respondent argues that the 1980 Notice of Lien is not a wrongful lien
because it does not purport to create a new lien, but "merely restates and
republishes"25 the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's. Respondent must be counting on this
Court not actually reading the documents. The only lien the Fabricated 1971
CC&R's purport to create is a lien for remedial expenses (e.g., if a lot owner
builds a non-conforming improvement and the Association removes it, the
23

Utah Code Ann. sec. 3 8 - 9 - 1 (2001) (definition of "wrongful lien").

24

Utah Code Ann. sec. 3 8 - 9 - 1 (2001) (definition of "interest holder").

25

Respondent/Appellee's Brief, p.44, line 21.
22

Association has a lien for its remedial expenses).26 The 1980 Notice of Lien
claims "a continuing lien. . . for the payment of annual maintenance assessment,
annual water share fees, special maintenance assessments, penalties and interest on
any or all of said items."27 The 1980 Notice of Lien goes far beyond the
Fabricated 1971 CC&R's. Respondent is currently relying on it in making
assessments that it knows are not authorized by the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's.
10. The issue of whether the 1980 Notice of Lien is a wrongful lien is
ripe for judicial determination because it encumbers Petitioner's lot.
Respondent argues that the question of whether the 1980 Notice of Lien is a
wrongful lien is not ripe for decision because "[t]he Association has never
attempted to collect assessments from Forest Meadows by lien foreclosure."
Petitioner replies that the Utah Wrongful Lien Act expressly authorizes the
filing of a petition by it as the present record owner of property "against which a
wrongful lien has been recorded." It does not say "against whom a wrongful lien
is being enforced." It is also relevant that under Utah Code Ann. section 78 - 40 1, an owner can challenge a lien as invalid without waiting for the lien claimant to
26

Fabricated 1971 CC&R's (Addendum Doc. "4" in Petitioner's Opening
Brief) p. 3, para. 19.
27

1980 Notice of Lien (Addendum Doc. "8" in Petitioner's Opening Brief).
23

seek to enforce the lien. The general legislative policy is to permit property
owners to clear their titles of wrongful liens without waiting for the lien claimants
tc/entbrcetheir liens.
The consequences of this Court adopting Respondent's non-statutory rules
would be disastrous for property owners. Under Respondent's "ripeness" rule, a
property owner will not be able to challenge a wrongful lien until the lien claimant
seeks to enforce it. But, under Respondent's "standing" rule any successor in
interest with notice will become bound by the wrongful lien by lack of "standing."
The wrongful lien claimant will just wait patiently for the property to be sold and
then enforce the lien.
11. Petitioner's action is timely because the applicable statute of
limitations for challenging an lien is four years from the last assessment - and
there is a pending assessment right now.
The trial court held that Petitioner's action was "untimely." The trial court
did not explain its holding in terms of the applicable statute of limitations, but the
statutory standard for timeliness is the statute of limitations.
The Utah Supreme Court covered the issue of the applicable statute of
limitations in 2002 in State of Utah v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co.?* In
28

2002UT75,52P.3dl257.
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that case, an irrigation company made an assessment against land owned by the
Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, one of its shareholders. The DWR
challenged the assessment on the grounds that the amendment to the articles of
incorporation under which the assessment was made was invalid. The trial court
ruled that because the amendment to the articles of incorporation had been made
more than four years before the DWR filed its action (four years being the
statutory period of limitations for an action based on a written contract29), the
statute of limitations had run against the DWR.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed and held that the statute expressly
provided that the period was four years after the last assessment, and since DWR
was challenging a current assessment, its action was timely.
"[W]henever [the irrigation company] makes a new assessment under the
purportedly unlawful mechanism, a new cause of action accrues on that
individual assessment, permitting the statute of limitations on the newly
arisen cause of action to run from the date of the new assessment. Inasmuch
as DWR alleges that [the irrigation company's] assessments were made
pursuant to an unlawful mechanism, DWR can assail the assessments by
challenging the mechanism upon which the assessments are based."30
In this case, Petitioner is assailing Respondent's right to make assessments

29

Utah Code Ann. sec. 78 -12 - 25 (2002) ("Within four years").

30

2002 UT 75, para. 19, 52 P.3d at 1262-63. Footnotes and citations

omitted.
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by challenging the mechanisms upon which the assessments are based - the
Fabricated 1971 CC&R's and the 1980 Notice of Lien. Regardless of how long
these documents have been on the books, Petitioner can challenge these
mechanisms now because there is now a pending assessment.
12. Petitioner's action is timely under equitable principles because
Respondent did not begin to make assessments until after the Special Service
District was dissolved in March of 2000, and Petitioner brought this action
that same month.
The trial court held Petitioner's action was untimely because of the length of
time the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's had been on the record - since August of 1971.
But, Respondent made no assessments until after the Special Service District was
dissolved in March of 2000. Although the Fabricated 1971 CC&R's were on the
books long before that date, it was not worth the cost of litigation to remove them.
They had been a dead letter for twenty-nine years.
If this Court remands this case for trial on this issue, Petitioner's evidence
will show that in the mid 1980's, a question arose of how to pay for maintaining
the roads, water, and other services in the Pine Meadow and the Forest Meadow
subdivisions. Assessing the lots under the various CC&R's was impractical for
two reasons - the CC&R's had not been properly signed and they were not
26

uniform. So, some lot owners petitioned Summit County to set up a special
service district to include all the subdivisions, making the validity of the various
CC&R's moot and permitting uniform assessments by lot. The county set up the
special service district and initially all went well. But, the character of the
subdivisions began to change as more and more people became year-round
residents. In 1999 a conflict arose between the residents (who wanted year round
services and assessments to pay for them) and the non-residents (who wanted
seasonal services and minimal assessments). At the time, the advisory board of
the special service district was composed entirely of non-residents, and the
residents complained to the county that the advisory board was supposed to be
composed of residents. The county's response was to dissolve the special service
district. The non-residents were (and still are) a majority of Respondent's
membership, so they decided to use the various CC&R's and the 1980 Notice of
Lien to continue their control over the subdivisions and to deny the residents year
round services.
Petitioner is aligned with the residents. It wants services to be provided
year round by a new special service district that will include not only all the Forest
Meadow and Pine Meadow subdivisions, but also all the other subdivisions and
properties in the Tollgate Canyon area. Ironically, it is Respondent who wants to
27

go on providing these services for free to the property owners outside the
subdivisions.
The trial court relied on "equity" as one of the grounds for its decision, but
one of the basic principles of equity is that it "follows" the law, supplementing but
not defeating legal rights. Petitioner filed its action as soon as Respondent
asserted the power to assess under the 1980 Notice of Lien. The action is timely
under the applicable Utah Statute of Limitations. Respondent has shown no
prejudice that would justify a defense of laches or waiver. This Court should hold
that equity does not defeat Petitioner's rights under the law.
Dated: November 19,2004
Respectfully submitted:

/s/ BoydlCinjiball Dyer
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER/APPELLANT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the following date I served two copies of the foregoing
Reply Brief by depositing the same in the U.S. Postal Service, first class postage
prepaid, addressed to the following person:
Mr. Edwin C. Barnes, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 - 2216
Dated: November 19, 2004
/s/ Boyd'Kimball Dyer
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ADDENDUM DOCUMENT "12" - Statutes Cited

TRUST BUSINESS
Section
7-5-1.
7-5-2.
7-5-5.
7-5-7.
7-5-9.

Definitions — Allowable trust companies — Exceptions.
Permit required to engage in trust
business — Exceptions.
Revocation of trust authority — Procedure.
Management and investment of
fands
fc^
Registration of investment m name
of nominee — Records — Possession of investment.

Section
7-5-10.
7-5-14.

Lending trust funds to trust company, officer, director, or employee
as felony.
Mergers, consolidations, acquisitions, transfers, or reorganizations
involving entities engaged in trust
business — Succession of rights
and duties — Petition for appointm e n t o f 3 ^ ^ fc^ company,

7-5-1. Definitions — Allowable trust companies — Exceptions.
(1) As used in this chapter:
(a) "Business trust" means an entity engaged in a trade or business that
is created by a declaration of trust that transfers property to trustees, to
be held and managed by them for the benefit of persons holding certificates
representing the beneficial interest in the trust estate and assets.
(b) "Trust business" means, except as provided in Subsection (l)(c), a
business in which one acts in any agency or fiduciary capacity, including
that of personal representative, executor, administrator, conservator,
guardian, assignee, receiver, depositary, or trustee under appointment as
trustee for any purpose permitted by law, including the definition of
"trust" set forth in Subsection 75-1-201(53).
(c) "Trust business" does not include the following means of holding
funds, assets, or other property:
(i) funds held in a client trust account by an attorney authorized to
practice law in this state;
(ii) funds held in connection with the purchase or sale of real estate
by a person authorized to act as a real estate broker in this state;
(iii) funds or other assets held in escrow by a person authorized by
the department in accordance with Chapter 22 or by the Utah
Insurance Department to act as an escrow agent in this state;
(iv) funds held by a homeowners' association or similar organization to pay maintenance and other related costs for commonly owned
property;
(v) funds held in connection with the collection of debts or payments on loans by a person acting solely as the agent or representative or otherwise at the sole direction of the person to which the debt
or payment is owed, including funds held by an escrow agent for
payment of taxes or insurance;
(vi) funds and other assets held in trust on an occasional or isolated
basis by a person who does not represent that he is engaged in the
trust business in Utah;

(vii) funds or other assets found by a court to be held in an implied,
resulting, or constructive trust;
(viii) funds or other assets held by a court appointed conservator,
guardian, receiver, trustee, or other fiduciary if:
(A) the conservator, receiver, guardian, trustee, or other fiduciary is responsible to the court in the same manner as a personal
representative under Title 75, Chapter 3, Part 5, Supervised
Administration, or as a receiver under Rule 66, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure;
(B) the conservator, trustee, or other fiduciary is a certified
public accountant or has qualified for and received a designation
as a certified financial planner, chartered financial consultant,
certified financial analyst, or similar designation suitable to the
court, that evidences the conservator's, trustee's, or other fiduciary's professional competence to manage financial matters;
(C) no trust company is willing or eligible to serve as conservator, guardian, trustee, or receiver after notice has been given
pursuant to Section 75-1-401 to all trust companies doing business in this state, including a statement of the value of the assets
to be managed. That notice need not be provided, however, if a
trust company has been employed by the fiduciary to manage the
assets; and
(D) in the event guardianship services are needed, the person
seeking appointment as a guardian under this Subsection (1) is a
specialized care professional, as that term is denned in Section
75-5-311, or a business or state agency that employs the services
of one of those professionals for the purpose of caring for the
incapacitated person, so long as the specialized care professional,
business, or state agency does not:
(I) profit financially or otherwise from, or receive compensation for acting in that capacity, except for the direct costs of
providing guardianship or conservatorship services; or
(ID otherwise have a conflict of interest in providing those
services;
(ix) funds or other assets held by a credit services organization
operating in compliance with Title 13, Chapter 21, Credit Services
Organizations Act;
(x) funds, securities, or other assets held in a customer account in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities by a regulated
securities broker, dealer, or transfer agent; or
(xi) funds, assets, and other property held in a business trust for
the benefit of holders of certificates of beneficial interest if the
fiduciary activities of the business trust are merely incidental to
conducting business in the business trust form.
(d) "Trust company" means an institution authorized to engage in the
trust business under this chapter. Only the following may be a trust
company:
(i) a Utah depository institution or its wholly owned subsidiary;
(ii) an out-of-state depository institution authorized to engage in
business as a depository institution in Utah or its wholly owned
subsidiary;
(iii) a corporation, including a credit union service organization,
owned entirely by one or more federally insured depository institutions as defined in Subsection 7-1-103(8);

(iv) a direct or indirect subsidiary of a depository institution
holding company that also has a direct or indirect subsidiary authorized to engage in business as a depository institution in Utah; and
(v) any other corporation continuously and lawfully engaged in the
trust business in this state since before July 1, 1981.
(2) Only a trust company may engage in the trust business in this state.
(3) The requirements of this chapter do not apply to:
(a) an institution authorized to engage in a trust business in another
state that is engaged in trust activities in this state solely to fulfill its
duties as a trustee of a trust created and administered in another state;
(b) a national bank, federal savings bank, federal savings and loan
association, or federal credit union authorized to engage in business as a
depository institution in Utah, or any wholly owned subsidiary of any of
these, to the extent the institution is authorized by its primary federal
regulator to engage in the trust business in this state; or
(c) a state agency that is otherwise authorized by statute to act as a
conservator, receiver, guardian, trustee, or in any other fiduciary capacity.
History: C. 1953, 7-5-1, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 16, § 6; 1982, ch. 6, § 1; 1986, ch. 1,
§ 11; 1989, ch. 267, § 26; 1991, ch. 133, § 14;
1994, ch. 200, § 37; 1995, ch. 49, § 24; 1997,
ch. 161, § 1; 1998, ch. 39, § 1; 2003, ch. 301,
I 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective June 1, 1995, substituted "an
out-of-state" for "a foreign" in Subsection
(IXdXii) and, in Subsection (3Xa), substituted
"an institution" for "a person that is," substitated "that for °r territory of the United

"guardian" and "trustee, or other fiduciary" in
the introductory phrase and substituting Subsections (lXcXviiiXA) to (D) for "if the conservatorship or receivership is under continuous
court supervision and no trust company is willing or eligible to serve as conservator or receiver," and added Subsection (3)(c)„ making a
stylistic change.
j ^ 1 9 9 g amendment, effective July 1,1998,
substituted "Subsection 75-1-201(53)" for "Subg e c t i o n 75.1.201(45)" in Subsection (l)(b).
^ 2 0 0 3 ^ ^ ^ e f f e c t i v e D e c e m b e r 31,

C
^
^ ^ ^ , » °
& a ^
'
and substituted "to fulfill for "for the purpose
of fulfilling "
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5,1997,
rewrote Subsection (lXcXviii), inserting

2003

> ad*" 1 Subsection (lXdXiii) and made
, .',
, , ,._,. ,
related and stylistic changes.
. Cross-References. - Business Trust RegN a t i o n Act, Title 16, Chapter 15.

7-5-2. Permit required to engage in trust business —
Exceptions.
(1) No trust company shall accept any appointment to act in any agency or
fiduciary capacity, such as but not limited to that of personal representative,
executor, administrator, conservator, guardian, assignee, receiver, depositary,
or trustee under order or judgment of any court or by authority of any law of
this state or as trustee for any purpose permitted by law or otherwise engage
in the trust business in this state, unless and until it has obtained from the
commissioner a permit to act under this chapter. This provision shall not apply
to any bank or other corporation authorized to engage and lawfully engaged in
the trust business in this state before July 1, 1981.
(2) Nothing in this chapter prohibits:
(a) any corporation organized under Title 16, Chapter 6a or 10a, from
acting as trustee of any employee benefit trust established for the
employees of the corporation or the employees of one or more other
corporations affiliated with the corporation;
(b) any corporation organized under Title 16, Chapter 6a, Utah Revised
Nonprofit Corporation Act, and owned or controlled by a charitable,
benevolent, eleemosynary, or religious organization from acting as a

trustee for that organization or members of that organization but not
offering trust services to the general public;
(c) any corporation organized under Title 16, Chapter 6a or 10a, from
holding in a fiduciary capacity the controlling shares of another corporation but not offering trust services to the general public; or
(d) any depository institution from holding in an agency or fiduciary
capacity individual retirement accounts or Keogh plan accounts established under Section 401(a) or 408(a) of Title 26 of the United States Code.
History: C. 1953, 7-5-2, enacted by L.
1981, eh. 16, § 6; 1982, ch. 6, § 2; 2000, ch,
S00
' § 5>
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, in Subsections

(2)(a) and (2)(c) substituted 'Chapter 6a or 10a"
for 'Chapter 6 or 10"; substituted "Chapter 6a,
Utah Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act" for
"Chapter 6" in Subsection (2)(b); and made a
stylistic change.

17-21-6. General duties of recorder — Records and indexes.
(1) Each recorder shall:
(a) keep an entry record, in which the recorder shall, upon acceptance of
any instrument, enter the instrument in the order of its reception, the
names of the parties to the instrument, its date, the hour, the day of the
month and the year of recording, and a brief description, and endorse upon
each instrument a number corresponding with the number of the entry;
(b) keep a grantors' index, in which the recorder shall index deeds and
final judgments or decrees partitioning or affecting the title to or possession of real property, which shall show the entry number of the instrument, the name of each grantor in alphabetical order, the name of the
grantee, the date of the instrument, the time of recording, the kind of
instrument, the book and page, and a brief description;
(c) keep a grantees' index, in which the recorder shall index deeds and
final judgments or decrees partitioning or affecting the title to or possession of real property, which shall show the entry number of the instrument, the name of each grantee in alphabetical order, the name of the
grantor, the date of the instrument, the time of recording, the kind of
instrument, the book and page, and a brief description;
(d) keep a mortgagors' index, in which the recorder shall enter all
mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, and other instruments in the nature of an
encumbrance upon real estate, which shall show the entry number of the
instrument, the name of each mortgagor, debtor, or person charged with
the encumbrance in alphabetical order, the name of the mortgagee, lien
holder, creditor, or claimant, the date of the instrument, the time of
recording, the instrument, consideration, the book and page, and a brief
description;
(e) keep a mortgagees' index, in which the recorder shall enter all
mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, and other instruments in the nature of an

encumbrance upon real estate, which shall show the entry number of the
instrument, the name of each mortgagee, hen holder, creditor, or claimant,
in alphabetical order, the name of the mortgagor or person charged with
the encumbrance, the date of the instrument, the time of recording, the
kind of instrument, the consideration, the book and page, and a brief
description;
(f) keep a tract index, which shall show by description every instrument
recorded, the date and the kind of instrument, the time of recording, and
the book and page and entry number;
(g) keep an index of recorded maps, plats, and subdivisions;
(h) keep an index of powers of attorney showing the date and time of
recording, the book, the page, and the entry number;
(i) keep a miscellaneous index, in which the recorder shall enter all
instruments of a miscellaneous character not otherwise provided for in
this section, showing the date of recording, the book, the page, the entry
number, the kind of instrument, from, to, and the parties;
(j) keep an index of judgments snowing the judgment debtors, the
judgment creditors, the amount of judgment, the date and time of
recording, the satisfaction, and the book, the page, and the entry number;
and
(k) keep a general recording index in which the recorder shall index all
executions and writs of attachment, and any other instruments not
required by law to be spread upon the records, and in separate columns
the recorder shall enter the names of the plaintiffs in the execution and
the names of the defendants in the execution.
(2) The recorder shall alphabetically arrange the indexes required by this
section and keep a reverse index.
(3) The tract index required by Subsection (l)(f) shall be kept so that it
shows a true chain of title to each tract or parcel, together with their
encumbrances, according to the records of the office.
(4) Nothing in this section prevents the recorder from using a single name
index if that index includes all of the indexes required by this section.
History: R.S. 1898 & CX. 1907, § 620; L.
1915, ch. 45, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 1579; R.S. 1933
& C. 1943,19-18-6; L. 1955, ch. 29, § 1; 1973,
ch. 24, § 1; 1980, ch. 20, § 2; 1983, ch. 69, § 5;
1999, ch. 85, § 5; 2001, ch. 241, § 11.
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, rewrote the section.
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30,
2001, in Subsection (lXh) deleted labeled 'powers of attorney*" near the beginning and added
"and time" after "the date"; in Subsection (IXj)

deleted "labeled 'judgments', each page divided
into columns headed, respectively" near the
beginning and added "the book, the page, and
the entry number" at die end; and made stylistic changes.
Cross-References.
—
Condominium
projects, duty to keep index, § 57-8-12.
Federal tax Kens, § 38-6-1.
Marketable record title, notice of claim of
interest, § 57-9-5.
Recording as imparting notice, § 57-3-102 et
seq.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Section
25-5-1.
25-5-2.
25-5-3.
25-5-4.
25-5-5.

Estate or interest in real property.
Wills and implied trusts excepted.
Leases and contracts for interest in
lands.
Certain agreements void unless written and signed.
Representation as to credit of third
person.

Section
25-5-6.
25-5-7.
25-5-8.
25-5-9.

Promise to answer for obligation of
another — When not required to
be in writing.
Contracts by telegraph deemed written.
Right to specific performance not affected.
Agent may sign for principal.

25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property.
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or
in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
History: R.S. 1898 & OL. 1907, §§ 1974,
2461; CJL 1917, §§ 4874, 5811; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 33-5-1.
Cross-References. — Contract for sale of
goods for $500 or more unenforceable in absence of some writing, § 70A-2-201.

Enforceability of security interests, § 7QA-9203.
Securities sales, statute of frauds inapplicable, § 70A-8-112.
Statute of frauds for kinds of personal property not otherwise covered, § 70A-1-206.

WRONGFUL LIEN
Section
38-9-1.
38-9-2.
38-9-3.
38-9-4.
38-9-5.

Definitions.
Scope.
County recorder may reject wrongful
lien within scope of employment —
Good faith requirement.
Civil liability for filing wrongful lien
— Damages.
Criminal liability for filing a wrongful lien — Penalties.

Section
38-9-6.
38-9-7.

Petition to file lien — Notice to
record interest holders — Summary relief— Contested petition.
Petition to nullify lien — Notice to
lien claimant — Summary relief—
Finding of wrongful lien — Wrongful lien is void.

38-9-1. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present,
lawful property interest in certain real property, including an owner, title
holder, mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner.
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real property
who offers a document for recording or filing with any county recorder in
the state asserting a lien or other claim of interest in certain real property.
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest in
certain real property.
(4) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a
present, lawful property interest in certain real property, including an
owner," titleholder, mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose
name and interest in that real property appears in the county recorder's
records for the county in which the property is located.
(5) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership interest in certain real property is recorded or filed in the county recorder's
records for the county in which the property is located.
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien
or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the
time it is recorded or filed is not:
& jaMi
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction in the state; or
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by trie
owner of the real property.
History: C. 1953, 38-9-1, enacted by L.
1997, ch. 125, i 2.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1997, ch. 125, § 2, repeals former § 38-9-1, as

enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 182, § 1, relating to
the liability of a person filing a wrongful lien,
and enacts the present section. See §§ 38-9-4
and 38-9-5 for present liability provisions.

57-1-12. Form of warranty deed — Effect.
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the following form:
WARRANTY DEED
(here insert name), grantor, of
(insert place of
residence), hereby conveys and warrants to
(insert name),
grantee, of
(insert place of residence), for the sum of
dollars, the following described tract
of land in
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the premises).
Witness the hand of said grantor this
(month/day/year).
A warranty deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a
conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises
therein named, together with all the appurtenances, rights, and privileges
thereunto belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his heirs, and personal
representatives, that he is lawfully seised of the premises; that he has good
right to convey the same; that he guarantees the grantee, his heirs, and
assigns in the quiet possession thereof; that the premises are free from all
encumbrances; and that the grantor, his heirs, and personal representatives
will forever warrant and defend the title thereof in the grantee, his heirs, and
assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever. Any exceptions to these covenants may be briefly inserted in the deed following the description of the land.
History: R.S. 1898 & CX. 1907, § 1981; ment, effective May 1, 2000, updated the date
CX. 1917, § 4881; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,78-1- line in the waranty deed form and made stylis11; L. 2000, ch. 75, § 20.
tic changes.
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend-

57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds — Qualifications.
(1) (a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be:
(i) any active member of the Utah State Bar who maintains a place
within the state where the trustor or other interested parties may
meet with the trustee to:
(A) request information about what is required to reinstate or
payoff the obligation secured by the trust deed;
(B) deliver written communications to the lender as required
by both the trust deed and by law;
<C) deliver funds to reinstate or payoff the loan secured by the
trust deed; or
(D) deliver funds by a bidder at a foreclosure sale to pay for the
purchase of the property secured by the trust deed,
(ii) any depository institution as defined in Section 7-1-103, or
insurance company authorized to do business and actually doing
business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the United States;
(iii) any corporation authorized to conduct a trust business and
actually conducting a trust business in Utah under the laws of Utah
or the United States;
(iv) any title insurance company or agency that:
(A) holds a certificate of authority or license under Title 31A,
Insurance Code, to conduct insurance business in the state;
(B) is actually doing business in the state; and
(C) maintains a bona fide office in the state;
(v) any agency of the United States government; or
(vi) any association or corporation that is licensed, chartered, or
regulated by the Farm Credit Administration or its successor.
(b) For purposes of this Subsection (1), a person maintains a bona fide
office within the state if that person maintains a physical office in the
state:
(i) that is open to the public;
(ii) that is staffed during regular business hours on regular business days; and
(iii) at which a trustor of a trust deed may in person:
(A) request information regarding a trust deed; or
(B) deliver funds, including reinstatement or payoff funds.
(c) Subsection (1) is not applicable to a trustee of a trust deed existing
prior to May 14, 1963, nor to any agreement that is supplemental to that
trust deed.
(d) The amendments in Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 2002, to this
Subsection (1) apply only to a trustee that is appointed on or after May 6,
2002.
(2) The trustee of a trust deed may not be the beneficiary of the trust deed,
unless the beneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under Subsection (l)(a)(ii),
(iii), (v), or (vi).
(3) The power of sale conferred by Section 57-1-23 may only be exercised by
the trustee of a trust deed if the trustee is qualified under Subsection (l)(a)(i)
or (iv).
(4) A trust deed with an unqualified trustee or without a trustee shall be
effective to create a lien on the trust property, but the power of sale and other
trustee powers under the trust deed may be exercised only if the beneficiary
has appointed a qualified successor trustee under Section 57-1-22.
History. L. 1961, ch. 181, § 3; 1963, ch.
110, § 1; 1969, ch. 162, § 1; 1985, ch. 64, § 1;
1996, ch. 182, § 25; 2001, ch. 236, § 2; 2002,

ch. 209, § 1; 2004, eh. 177, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, added the words

"active" and "residing in Utah" to Subsection
(l)(a)(i); added "and actually doing business" in
Subsections UXa)(ii) and (iv); added "and actually conducting a trust business" in Subsection
(lXaXiii); added Subsections (3) and (4); and
made stylistic changes.
The 2002 amendment, effective May 6, 2002,
added Subsection dXa)(i)(B) and made related
changes; rewrote Subsection (lXaXiv); added
Subsections (l)(b) and (l)(d); redesignated former Subsection (1Kb) as (IXc) and substituted
"May 14, 1963" for "the effective date of this

chapter"; and deleted "prior to the exercise of
those powers" after "only if" in Subsection (4).
The 2004 amendment, effective May 3, 2004,
substituted the ending to Subsection (lXaXi)
beginning "maintains a place" for "(A) resides in
Utah; or (B) maintains a bona fide office in the
state" and made stylistic changes.
Coordination clause. — Laws 2002, ch.
209, § 8 directed the substitution of "Chapter
209, Laws of Utah 2002" for "this act" in Subsection (lXd).

57-4a-4. Presumptions.
(1) A recorded document creates the following presumptions regarding title
to the real property affected:
(a) the document is genuine and was executed voluntarily by the person
purporting to execute it;
(b) the person executing the document and the person on whose behalf
it is executed are the persons they purport to be;
(c) the person executing the document was neither incompetent nor a
minor at any relevant time;
(d) delivery occurred notwithstanding any lapse of time between dates
on the document and the date of recording;
(e) any necessary consideration was given;
(f) the grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an interest created or
described by the document acted in good faith at all relevant times;
(g) a person executing a document as an agent, attorney in fact, officer
of an organization, or in a fiduciary or official capacity:
(i) held the position he purported to hold and acted within the scope
of his authority;
(ii) in the case of an officer of an organization, was authorized
under all applicable laws to act on behalf of the organization; and
(iii) in the case of an agent, his agency was not revoked, and he
acted for a principal who was neither incompetent nor a minor at any
relevant time;
(h) a person executing the document as an individual:
(i) was unmarried on the effective date of the document; or
(ii) if it otherwise appears from the document that the person was
married on the effective date of the document, the grantee was a bona
fide purchaser and the grantor received adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth so that the joinder of the
nonexecuting spouse was not required under Sections 75-2-201
through 75-2-207;
(i) if the document purports to be executed pursuant to or to be a final
determination in a judicial or administrative proceeding, or to be executed
pursuant to a power of eminent domain, the court, official body, or
condemnor acted within its jurisdiction and all steps required for the
execution of the document were taken; and
(j) recitals and other statements of fact in a document, including
without limitation recitals concerning mergers or name changes of organizations, are true.
(2) The presumptions stated in Subsection (1) arise even though the
document purports only to release a claim or to convey any right, title, or
interest of the person executing it or the person on whose behalf it is executed.
History: C. 1953, 57-4a-4, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 155,1 22; 1989, ch, 88, § 11.

75-7-816.

Recitals w h e n title to real property is i n trust —
Failure.

(1) When title to real property is granted to a person as trustee, the terms
of the trust may be given either:
(a) in the deed of transfer; or
(b) in an instrument signed by the grantor and recorded in the same
office as the grant to the trustee.
(2) If the terms of the trust are not made public as required in Subsection
(1), a conveyance from the trustee is absolute in favor of purchasers for value
who take the property without notice of the terms of the trust.
(3) The terms of the trust recited in the deed of transfer or the instrument
recorded under Subsection (l)(b) shall include:
(a) the name of the trustee;
(b) the address of the trustee; and
(c) the name and date of the trust.
(4) Any real property titled in a trust which has a restriction on transfer
described in Section 25-6-14 shall include in the title the words "asset
protection trust."
History: C. 1953, 75-7-816, enacted by L.
2004, ch. 89, § 97.

75-7-409.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2004, ch. 89, § 123
makes the act effective on July 1, 2004.

R e c i t a l s w h e n title t o real p r o p e r t y is i n t r u s t e e
— Failure.

1
U W l 0 1 1 titl? to real Property is granted to a person as trustee, the terms of
the trust may be given either:
(a) in the deed of transfer; or
(b) in an instrument signed by the grantor and recorded in the same
office as the grant to the trustee.
(2) If the terms of the trust are not made public as required in Subsection
(1), a conveyance Srom the trustee is absolute in favor of purchasers for value
who take the property without notice of the terms of the trust.
iJ
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78-12-25. Within four years.
An action may be brought within four years:
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an open
account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished;
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last
payment is received;
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections
of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10;
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1);
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-25; L. 1988, ch. 59, § 14; 1996,
ch. 79, § 110.
Cross-References. — Antitrust Act actions,
§ 76-10-925.

Product Liability Act, statute of limitations,
§ 78-15-3.

78-40-1. Action to determine adverse claim to property —
Authorized.
An action may be brought by any person against another who claims an
J a l T Z Z S i real^roper^ o / a n interest or claim to personal property
adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim.
H ; ^ ™ - T 1951 ch. 58. § 1; C. 1943,
?SilI.i

Bah
c

color of title, §§ 57-6-1 et seq., § 7^40-5.
Jurisdiction in district courts, Utah Const,

ADDENDUM DOCUMENT "13" - Trial Court's Ruling and Order of March 22,2004

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FOREST MEADOW RANCH PROPERTY
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, LLC,
Petitioner,

RULING and ORDER
Case No. 000600092

vs.

Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK

PINE MEADOW RANCH HOME
ASSOCIATION et.al.,

DATE: March 22, 2004

Respondents.
The above matter came before the court on March 15, 2004,
for oral argument on Petitioner's and Respondents' cross motions
for summary judgment and petitioner's motion to strike.
Plaintiff was present through Boyd Kimball Dyer, and Defendant
was present through Edwin C. Barnes.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner originally sought summary relief to nullify
.wrongful liens. The liens arise as a result of Petitioner's
alleged failure to pay association fees to Respondent and
Respondent's filing of a lien against Petitioner's property based
on such failure to pay fees.
Petitioner is a record interest holder in lot 105A Forest
Meadow Ranch Plat "D" (Lot 105A-D), which was originally part of
Lot 105 that has been subdivided into approximately 500 lots.
In 1965, Security Title Company (Security) as "Trustee" not
named on the warranty deed received by that warranty deed several
square miles of real property from F.E. Bates and Mae P. Bates.
That land was later subdivided and became the Forest Meadow
subdivision and Pine Meadow subdivision. Security Title was
listed on the deed as "Trustee" and no beneficiary was named.
On March 10, 1971, Deseret created its Articles of
Incorporation, signed by W. Brent Jensen (Jensen), and those were
filed with the Secretary of State on March 18, 1971. On July 8,
1971, the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions
(CCRs) was signed by Jensen. On July 22, 1971, Jensen filed and
recorded, on behalf of Deseret Diversified Development for Forest
Meadow Ranch the CC&R's for southern part of the subdivision
(Forest Meadow CC&R's). The CCRs provided that Deseret was the
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owner of the land and the Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners
Association and assigns would administer and enforce the CCRs
The Forest Meadow CCRs further stated:
The reservations and restrictive covenants herein set
out are to run with the land and shall be binding upon
all persons owning or occupying any lot, parcel or
portion of the real property enumerated at the
beginning hereof until January 1, 1990, and for
successive twenty (20) year periods unless within six
(6) months of the end of the initial period or any
twenty (20) year period thereafter a written agreement
executed by the then record owners of more than threequarters (3/4) in area of said real property included
herein is recorded with the Summit County Recorder . .
There was no reference to association assessments in the
Forest Meadow CCRs. On July 20, 1971, plat D was signed by
Deseret and Security as owners, and on August 9, 1972, that
Forest Meadow Ranch plat was recorded (plat). The plat was
signed by Deseret Development by Jensen, President; Lee Ann
Hunter, secretary of Deseret; and by two Security Title Company
employees as Trustees. The plat stated:
Know all men by these presents that we, the four
undersigned owners of the above described tract of
land, having caused the same to be subdivided into lots
& streets hereafter to be known as: FOREST MEADOW
RANCH, PLAT "D" do hereby dedicate for perpetual use of
the public all parcels of land shown on this plat as
intended for public use.
The plat further stated under the SUBDIVIDERS NOTE:
The recording of this plat shall not constitute a
dedication of roads and street or rights of way to
public use. It is intended that all streets shown
hereon shall remain the property of the subdivider,
Deseret Diversified Development, Inc. - and shall be
completely maintained by said owners.
Forest Meadow Ranch Landowners Association (Petitioner) was
formed as the homeowners association for the Forest Meadow
subdivision. Lot 105A-D is partly within the North half of
Section 22, Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian and partly in the South half of said section.
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On August 14, 197 3, Jensen and Vincent B. Tolman created the
Pine Meadow Ranch Homeowners Association to act as the homeowners
association for the Pine Meadow Subdivision (Pine Meadows
Association).
On September 28, 1973, Jensen on behalf of Pine Meadows
Association recorded CCRs for the northern part of the
subdivision in the name of Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc. (PMRI CCRs).
The PMRI CCRs state:
[A]11 of the properties described above shall be held,
sold and conveyed subject to the following easements,
restrictions, covenants, and conditions, which are for
the purpose of protecting the value and desirability
of, and which shall run with, the real property and be
binding on all parties having any right, title or
interest in .the described properties or any part
thereof, their heirs, successors and assigns, and shall
inure to the benefit of each owner thereof.
The PMRI CCRs provided the rights of the Pine Meadows
Association, which include right to make assessments, lot owners
personal obligation to pay assessments and Respondent's ability
to impose liens against the property for failure to pay such
assessments.
Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions have always
shared a common water and roadway system.
On January 15, 1975, a special warranty deed was recorded to
convey title in Lot 105 from Security Title Company, Trustee to
Jensen Investment. Title conveyed was "subject to easements,
restrictions and rights of way appearing of record or enforceable
in law and equity and taxes for the year 1975 and thereafter."
On January 16, 1975, a deed was recorded from Jensen
Investment conveying the east half of lot 105A-D to Clifton Emmet
Clark and Sharon M. Clark (Clarks) by quitclaim deed. That same
day, another entry was made relating to the east half of Lot
105A-D, a conveyance by Jensen Investment to the Clarks of the
same portion by warranty deed. On July 23, 1975, the Clarks
reconveyed by quitclaim deed the east half of Lot 105A-D back to
Jensen Investment.
On July 22, 1975, recorded on July 23, 1975, Jensen
Investment conveyed by warranty deed Lot 105A-D to Harold E.
Waldhouse and Maylene C. Waldhouse (Waldhouses).

3
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Respondent claims that Pine Meadow Association and Forest
Meadow Association merged by majority shareholder vote on May 30,
1978 (the Association or Respondent). Petitioner disputes such
merger occurred because there are no certified copies of the
Articles of Merger from the Utah Division of Corporations and
Commercial Code. That dispute is not necessary to resolve in
this case.
Respondent claims that the record chain title owner at the
time of the merger, Clifton Emmet Clark and Sharon M. Clark
(Clarks), voted in favor of and supported the merger of the
Associations. Petitioner disputes this arguing that the Clarks
no longer owned the property at the time of the merger.
On December 12, 1988, recorded on December 13, 1988, the
Waldhouses conveyed by warranty deed title to 105A-D to Shelley
J. Oakason a/k/a Shelley J. Liftos (Oakason) reserving oil, gas,
and mineral rights.
On October 29, 1998, a warranty deed dated October 15, 1998,
was recorded conveying title from Oakason to Axel Grabowski
(Grabowski). Grabowski took title "[sjubject to easements,
restrictions and rights of way appearing of record. . . . "
On December 9, 1999, Grabowski conveyed title to Lot 105A-D
to Petitioner herein by quitclaim deed, which was recorded on
December 10, 1999. The named petitioner herein is made up only of
Grabowski.
Since the alleged merger, the Association has operated as
the homeowners' association for the 800 plus lots, homes and
cabins in the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow Subdivisions. Lot
ownership has been the basis for membership in the Association,
including assessments and notice of and the right to vote at the
Association's annual meetings. The Association has assessed lots
to pay for its operations and has received payment of assessments
from lot owners. Respondent claims that the primary
responsibility of the Association is to own, maintain and insure
the road system in the Pine Meadow Ranch area for the benefit of
all the Association's members and their invitees. Petitioner
disputes this and claims that the roads are owned by the lot
owners. (Even if the roads are owned by the lot owners, the
issues here relate to whether the CCRs reflected the
Association's duty to own, maintain and insure the road system.)
The Association also owns, maintains and insures a
substantial amount of open space for the benefit of its members.

4
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In October 1985, the Summit County Commission determined to
establish the Pine Meadow Special Service District (the "SSD")
for the provision of water service and the maintenance of
roadways in the Pine Meadow areas for the benefit of the lot
owners. Predecessor owners of Forest Meadow Lot 105 paid taxes
to and received benefits from the SSD. The SSD was dissolved by
vote of the Summit County Commission in the spring of 2000. On
March 20, 2000, the SSD executed a "Deed of Easement" conveying
to the Association, an easement for the operation and maintenance
of "public roads connecting such roads and ways to the Pine
Meadow and Forest Meadow Subdivisions, including the road known
as Tollgate Canyon Road." In Pine Meadow Ranch Owners
Association,
Inc. v. Summit County, Utah Third District Court,
Summit County, case no. 6181, the Court concluded that the roads
within Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions are private
roads, not public.
Since the conveyance from the SSD, the Association has
maintained, improved and insured the roadways in the Pine Meadow
and Forest Meadow subdivisions and has continued to own and
insure open space, and to extend power lines and provide other
benefits for its members. The Association has continued to
assess and receive payment for fees. The Association has spent
hundreds of thousands of dollars and currently has an annual
budget of $140,000.
On July 25, 1980, the Association republished the Forest
Meadow and PMRI CCRs in the form of a "Notice of Lien" (Lien
Notice). Petitioner disputes that the CCRs were merely to
confirm public notice of the CCRs, rather it expands the powers
of Respondent to make assessments. Since recording the Lien
Notice, the Association has continued to collect its assessments
and perform its other functions.
In 2003, the Association recorded a "Clarification of Notice
of Lien" (Clarification) confirming that the Lien Notice was
intended merely to republish the existing CCRs and other
encumbrances of record and not to create any new charge or
encumbrance on any property. Petitioner disputes that the
Clarification clarifies anything. Petitioner claims that the
Clarification is a new wrongful lien because by its terms it
makes a claim that Respondent has title to the roadways in
disregard of the rights of the lot owners who have record title
to the roads.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 6, 2000, Petitioner filed a petition to nullify
5
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wrongful liens against the Association with regard to the Notice
Lien. On March 20, 2000, the court heard oral arguments on the
sufficiency of the petition and affidavit under the Utah wrongful
lien statute. On March 27, 2000, the court ruled that
Petitioner's petition for summary relief be denied because if
Petitioner's claim was correct, then approximately 500 lots may
be similarly situated as Petitioner's lot 105A-D and the relief
requested exceeded the remedy of a summary proceeding because
Petitioner sought damages. The court entered an Order on this
Ruling on May 18, 2000, and sua sponte granted Petitioner leave
to amend as a non summary proceeding within thirty days.
On May 17, 2000, Petitioner filed an amendment to Petition
for Summary Relief to Nullify Wrongful Lien pursuant to the Utah
wrongful lien statute, Utah Code § 38-9-1 et seg. modifying
Petitioner's prayer for relief to limit the petition to: (1) the
issue of whether the 1980 Notice Lien is a "wrongful lien" as
defined by the Utah Wrongful Line Statute and (2) if the court
finds it to be a wrongful lien, the issue of what relief is in
accordance with the facts and the law. Petitioner requested that
the court permit discovery limited to those issues and upon
completion of discovery the court hold a non-summary hearing on
those issues. Petitioner seeks a declaration that the CCRs
recorded in 1971 and 1973 are void and petitioner should not be
required to pay any assessments.
The parties engaged in discovery.
On October 14, 2003, Petitioner filed its motion for summary
j udgment.
On December 10, 2003, Respondent filed its cross motion for
summary judgment and opposition to Petitioner's motion for
summary judgment.
On December 16, 2003, Petitioner filed its reply memoranda
in support of its motion for summary judgment. That same day,
Petitioner filed a motion to strike Respondent's cross motion for
summary judgment and opposition to Petitioner's motion for
summary judgment because it failed to comply with former Utah R.
Jud. Adm. 4-501 (now known as Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)).
Specifically, Petitioner argued that Respondent's memoranda
failed to comply with the motion practice rule because it
combined its cross motion for summary judgment with its
opposition to Petitioner's motion.
On January 5, 2003, Respondent filed its opposition to
Petitioner's motion to strike. Respondent argued that for the
6
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sake of judicial economy and the parties, the court should allow
Respondent to respond in a combined memoranda.
On January 7, 2004, Petitioner filed its reply memorandum in
support of its motion to strike.
LAW
When both parties move for summary judgment, the court is
not bound to grant it to one side or another. Diamond T. Utah,
Inc. v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 441 P.2d 705 (1968). Cross motions
for summary judgment do not warrant the court's granting of
summary judgment unless one of the moving parties is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law upon facts that are not genuinely
disputed. Amjacs Interwest,
Inc. v. Design Assocs.
, 635 P.2d 53
(Utah 1981).
Cross motions may be viewed as involving a contention by
each movant that no genuine issues of material fact exists under
the theory it advances, but not as a concession that no dispute
remains under the theory advanced by its adversary. Wycalis
v.
Guardian Title,
780 P.2d 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); cert, denied,
789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). In effect, each cross movant implicitly
contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but
that if the court determines otherwise, factual disputes exist
that preclude judgment as a matter of law in favor of the other
side.
Id.
The court has discretion to decide whether to allow
memoranda not in conformance with the rules.
Section 57-3-103 (2000) of the Utah Recording Act provides:
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is
void as against any subsequent purchaser of the same
property, or any portion of it, if: (1) the subsequent
purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for
a valuable consideration, and (2) the subsequent
purchaser's document is first recorded.
Section 57-4a-4 provides:
A recorded document creates the following presumptions
regarding title to the real property affected: . . .
.(e) any necessary consideration was given; (f) the
grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an interest
created or described in the document acted in good
faith at all relevant times; . . . .
7
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Covenants that run with the land must have the following
characteristics: (1) the covenant must touch and concern the
land; (2) the covenanting parties must intend the covenant to run
with the land; and (3) there must be privity of estate.
Flying
Diamond

Oil

Corporation

v.

Newton

Sheep

Company,

77 6 P.2d 618,

622-23 (Utah 1989). However, the law of covenant running with
the land has long been a source of some confusion. Id.
"For a
covenant to run in equity, it must 'touch and concern' the land,
and there must be an intent that it run. Privity is not
required, but the successor must have notice of the covenant."
Id. at 623 n.6. Although the touch and concern and intent
requirements are somewhat interrelated, the absence of any one of
the requirements prevents a covenant from running with the land.
Id. at 623.

Id.

Not every covenant binds subsequent owners or
users of the land, even though the covenant purports to
be a covenant that runs with the land. The effect of
the touch-and-concern requirement is to restrict the
types of duties and liabilities that can burden future
ownership of interests in the land. The touch-andconcern requirement focuses on the nature of the
burdens and benefits that a covenant creates. What is
essential is that the burdens and benefits created must
relate to the land and the ownership of an interest in
it; the burdens and benefits created are not the
personal duties or rights of the parties to a covenant
that exist independently from the ownership of an
interest in the land. . . .
[T]o touch and concern the land, a covenant must
bear upon the use and enjoyment of the land and be of
the kind that the owner of an estate or interest in
land may make because of his ownership right.
at 623-24.

The original parties to the covenant must have intended that
the covenant run with the land. Id. at 627. The parties intent
may be determined by an express statement in the document or
implied by the nature of the covenant itself. Id.
At first
blush, a covenant to pay may appear personal, however, a promise
to pay may touch and concern the land if its purpose is -to
benefit the covenantor's interest in the land, e.g., the
establishment of an easement may touch and concern the land, a
covenant to pay for the use of an easement may be part of a
covenant running with the land. Id. at 625.
Privity of estate is also required. Id. at 628. There are
three types of privity of estate: (1) mutual, e.g., a covenant
8
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arising from simultaneous interests in the same land; (2)
horizontal, e.g., a covenant created in connection with a
conveyance of an estate from one of the parties to another and
(3) vertical, e.g., the devolution of an estate burdened or
benefitted by a covenant from an original covenanting party to a
successor. Id.
"[Vertical privity] arises when the person
presently claiming the benefit, or being subjected to the burden,
is a successor to the estate of the original person so benefitted
or burdened." Id.
A strict approach to privity has been
abandoned and substance prevails over technical form, e.g.,
a
homeowner's association which had no interest in property at all
can sue to enforce a covenant.
Id.
Restrictive covenants that run with the land and
encumber subdivision lots form a contract between
subdivision property owners as a whole and individual
lot owners; therefore, interpretation of the covenants
is governed by the same rules of construction as those
used to interpret contracts.
Swenson v. Erickson,
998 P.2d 807, 810-11 (Utah 2000).
Restrictive covenants are enforceable in equity
against all those who take the estate with notice of
them, although they may not be, strictly speaking, real
covenants so as to run with the land or of a nature to
create a technical qualification of the title conveyed
by the deed. The question is not whether the covenant
runs with the land, but whether a party will be
permitted to use the land in a manner inconsistent with
the contract entered into by his or her vendor, where
the purchase was made with notice of such covenant.
The enforcement of restrictive covenants or equitable
servitudes is based on the principle of notice; that
is, a person taking title to land with notice of a
restriction upon it will not, in equity and good
conscience, be permitted to violate such restriction. .
Constructive or actual notice of a restrictive
covenant imposed in furtherance of a building or
development scheme, on the part of one against whom
enforcement is sought is essential. Accordingly,
restrictions on the use of land in a subdivision
embraced by a general plan of development can be
enforced against a subsequent purchaser who takes title
to the land with notice of the restriction. . . .
A purchaser with notice of restrictive covenants
upon land is bound by such restrictions, although they
are not such as in strict legal contemplation run with
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the land. Thus, even though a covenant does not run
with the land, it may be enforceable against a
transferee of the covenantor who takes with knowledge
of its terms under circumstances which would make it
inequitable to permit avoidance of the restriction.
Such a covenant is binding on a purchaser with notice
not merely because such purchaser stands as an assignee
of the party who made the agreement, but because he or
she has taken the estate with notice of a valid
agreement concerning it. The enforcement against a
purchaser with notice rests upon the principle that it
would be inequitable to permit such an owner, while
enjoying the fruits of and claiming under the grant,
part of the consideration for which was the benefit
promised by the covenant, to destroy such benefit by
violating the covenant.
20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants §§ 266-67(1995).
ARGUMENTS
Petitioner argues that Deseret did not have record title to
Lot 105 at the time it recorded Forest Meadows CCRs to the
property, therefore, having no recorded deed to the property it
was unable to bind the lot with CCRs that would run with the
land. When Deseret recorded the CCRs in 1971, it had notice that
record title to the land was held by Security. If Deseret wanted
to bind the lot with covenants running with the land, it knew to
obtain a deed and record it, but failed to do so. Therefore,
Petitioner argues that Petitioner's chain of title is superior to
Respondent's and the CCRs do not apply to Petitioner. Petitioner
argues that only if Deseret had fee simple title could it bind
the land with such covenants. Because Deseret had no privity of
estate, it could not bind the land. Petitioner argues that
Security was listed as Trustee in the 1965 warranty deed from
Bates, and because there are no contemporaneous documents showing
Security was Trustee for Deseret, the court is to disregard the
word "Trustee" and the court -should simply read the 1965 warranty
deed to be from Bates to Security, who was the fee simple owner
in 1971 when Jensen and Deseret purported to create the CCRs.
Petitioner calls this the doctrine of "descriptio personae."
See, e.g., TWN, Inc.,
v. Michele,
66 P.3d 1031 (Utah App. 2003).
Petitioner also argues that the 1971 CCRs only covered a
portion of the development, and that in part is why other CCRs
were filed in 1973, and that act further indicates that the 1971
CCRs were not valid. Petitioner also argues that the attempt by
Respondent to have the court determine who could validly file
CCRs in 1971 and 1973 should be rejected because the CCRs and
10
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plats filed with the recorder do nothing more than give inquiry
notice that perhaps others have an interest in the land.
However, without a deed, Deseret cannot be heard to claim they
owned the land such that they can bind it with CCRs.
Respondent argues that Petitioner lacks standing to
challenge the CCR's because it took title to Lot 105A-D subject
to easements, restrictions and rights of way appearing of record
from Grabowski, who received title from Oakson. Furthermore,
Respondent argues that the Petitioner's predecessors paid
association dues and this confirms their acceptance of and
agreement with the CCR's. Respondent also argues that the Clarks
voted in favor of and supported the merger of associations.
Respondent argues that the recording of CCRs does not purport to
document conveyance of a property interest. Instead the CCRs are
a contract established by a prior owner which affects property
and is construed under the principles of contract law that such
restrictive covenants run with the land and encumber subdivision
lots form a contract between subdivision property owners as a
whole and individual lot owners. Moreover, Respondent argues
that restrictive covenants are enforceable in equity when a
purchaser has notice of such covenants at the time of purchase.
Here, Petitioner had notice of the CCRs and Lien Notice prior to
receiving its property interest in 105A-D, therefore, it took
such interest subject to the CCRs. Respondent argues that
Petitioner has not offered any evidence to overcome the
presumption that Deseret was owner or developer at the time the
CCRs were recorded. Respondent argues that the recorded
subdivision plat confirms that Deseret and Security had mutuality
of estate and interest in the ownership of Lot 105 which is
presumed to be true because it is a recorded document and
Petitioner fails to rebut that presumption. Respondent footnotes
that if the court grants Petitioner's petition that it will be
unable to do what it is supposed to by assessing fees and
maintaining the roads and common areas, therefore, the
subdivision will collapse and result in anarchy.
Petitioner replies that under Utah law, the words "subject
to easements, restrictions and rights of way currently of record"
only limit the warranty given in a deed, they do not create any
interest. Such a phrase does not convey anything to anyone,
therefore, such phrase does not validate the 1971 CCRs. Clarks'
vote on the merger is irrelevant because he did not own Lot 105AD at the time of the vote and the merger of the two homeowners'
associations had nothing to do with the validity of the 1971 CCRs
and the vote could not convey any interest in real property.
Petitioner also argues that the CCRs are an interest in real
property in the nature of an equitable servitude or real
11
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covenant, not as Respondent claims, merely a matter of contract.
Petitioner argues that actual notice is insufficient to validate
the CCRs, compliance with the Recording Act is required.
Petitioner also argues that equitable title to land by Deseret
through Security as Trustee is contrary to Utah law and factually
impossible because Deseret did not exist at the time that the
Bates conveyed title to Security. Petitioner argues that the
only way that Deseret could have acquired any interest in the
land was by deed or written instrument, and if any such deed or
instrument ever existed, it is now void because it was not timely
recorded. Petitioner argues that in order for covenants to bind
a subsequent purchaser like Petitioner, there must be vertical
privity of estate between the owner who was originally bound by
them and the subsequent purchaser. Petitioner argues that the
CCRs are not binding on Petitioner because there is no vertical
privity of estate between Deseret and Petitioner. Petitioner
asserts that the presumption of UCA 57-41-4 applies to the
warranty deed also, and it is at odds with the presumption
concerning the CCRs and so the deed should govern. Finally,
Petitioner argues that the court should reject Respondent's
argument that it must be able to make mandatory assessments or
the subdivisions will collapse because it is the classic
justification for tyranny.
DISCUSSION
1. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE.
CJA 4-501 was repealed effective November 1, 2003, and its
substance was enacted in URCP Rule 7(c). The court has
discretion in requiring compliance with the rules formerly and
even though now enacted in a rule of procedure, the court feels
the same. Although Rule 7 does not technically provide for an
opposition to a motion for summary judgment to be filed combined
with a cross motion for summary judgment, the court agrees with
defendants that for judicial economy such is a practical
approach. The court will consider all of the pleadings of the
parties.
Therefore, the court DENIES plaintiff's motion to strike.
2. CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
There appear to be factual disputes about some of those
issues, but the parties indicate and argue that there are no
facts to try. In part because of the age of these activities, the
parties agree that the court should and must decide these issues
12
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as a matter of law on the record before it.
(1) The court concludes that the cases relied on by
Petitioner do not govern this proceeding.
Petitioner relies upon TWN,. Inc.,
v. Michel,
supra, 66 P.3d
1031, where parties both asserted ownership of a parcel that was
passed to one party's predecessor in interest by "Richard A
Christenson, Trustee" and the other parcel passed to the other
party's predecessor in interest by "Richard A. Christensen." The
issue in TWN was whether a grantor's unexplained placing of the
word "trustee" next to his or her name on a real property deed
results, as a matter of law, in conveyance of only a trust
interest. The court concluded that the "descriptio personae"
doctrine applied which is when "certain terms sometimes added to
a person's name [that] are merely descriptive matter intended to
clarify the identity of the person, but their use or non-use
should generally play no part in the validity of the conveyance."
Id. at 1033. The concept of descriptio personae has long been
recognized to the identification of parties on real property
deeds. Id. at 1034. The court concluded that the unexplained
word "trustee" on a real property deed does not, absent other
circumstances suggesting the creation or existence of a trust,
create a trust or implicate only a trust interest. Id.
The
Court also noted that UCA § 75-7-402(5) authorizes a trustee to
dispose of trust property "in the name of the trustee as
trustee." But something more is required, e.g., "in my capacity
as trustee for the XYZ trust," or alternatively a party may
resort to extrinsic evidence to show that a trust was in fact
intended.
Here, there is no competing title interests in property.
There is no dispute that Petitioner is the record title holder to
the property. It is undisputed that Petitioner's title traces
back to Security Title. It is undisputed that Security Title's
name is on the deed as trustee. However, here, other
circumstances exist that did not exist in TWN. Specifically, the
name of the trustee, Security Title, was one that would generally
be seen as a trustee, not a property owner. A title company
often holds title to property as trustee. Furthermore, the
recorded plat map reflected Deseret as the owner of the property
and Security Title as trustee. The recorded plat map clearly
reflects Security Title as the trustee of the property and
Deseret as owners of the property. Moreover, it is undisputed
that Deseret had recorded CCRs with protective covenants and
listed Deseret as owner of the land. The court concludes that
the word "trustee" under the circumstances surrounding this case
reflected the existence of a trust and that Deseret was the
13
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beneficiary and owner of the property.
Petitioner also relies upon Dunlap v. Stichting
Mayflower
Mountain Fonds, 76 P.3d 711 (Utah App. 2003), where the parties
both asserted ownership of a mining claim through differing
chains of title. Here, as previously stated there is no
competing title interest. There is no dispute that Petitioner is
the record title holder to the property.
Petitioner also relies upon Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v.
Newton Sheep Company, 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989). In that case,
the parties conflict involved an agreement regarding the surface
right of land. The court concluded that the agreement governing
the surface right of the land created a covenant, which ran with
the land because it touched and concerned the land, it was the
intent of the original parties, there was privity of estate, and
the agreement was in writing. Petitioner argues that here, there
is no privity of estate.
The court is not persuaded. Applying substance over form,
there is vertical privity of estate. As stated above, under the
circumstances, it is clear that Security Title was Trustee for
Deseret. Deseret recorded the CCRs as owner. Petitioner's
successor in interest received title from Security Title as
Trustee for Deseret. Deseret expressly stated that "the
reservations and restrictive covenants herein set out are to run
with the land and shall be binding upon all persons owning or
occupying any lot . . . ." Later, Pine Meadow's CCRs expressly
stated that "all of the properties . . . shall be held, sold and
conveyed subject to the following easements, restrictions,
covenants, and conditions, which are for the purpose of
protecting the value and desirability of, and which shall run
with, the real property." Clearly, these covenants touched and
concerned the land and the express intent was for them to do so.
Accordingly, as in Flying Diamond, the CCRs run with the land and
Petitioner is bound by them.
The basic argument by the Association is that competing
titles are not involved in those cases, and -here title is clear
in Petitioner, but such title is burdened by the prior recorded
covenants.
The court agrees that this fact situation is not one of
competing titles. The warranty deed of 1965 indeed names
Security Title as Trustee and it does not name who it is trustee
for. However, other documents, some executed by Security Title,
later demonstrate that the CCR's signed by Jensen on behalf of
Deseret show Security believed it was fee simple owner only for
14
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Deseret, even though Deseret did not exist in 1965. Extraneous
and reasonably contemporaneous evidence shows that Security was
not the intended owner in fee simple and the word Trustee by its
name does more than describe Security. It shows Security's
interest and while it alone does not create a trust interest,
other evidence and documents show Deseret had an interest in the
land. Deseret has not attempted to do anything to the land
inconsistent with its own ownership interest. Security could have
done the same thing to the land. Deseret does not claim title.
It merely encumbered the land which it could do as owner. Title
companies are in the business of holding title in trust for
someone or some other entity. The CCRs here make clear that
anyone who buys this land takes it subject to certain
restrictions, which is again not out of the ordinary. Deseret
has done more than merely "claim" an interest in the land. That
claim was verified and confirmed by the trustee Security when it
signed the plat.
(2) The court does not accept the "anarchy" argument of
Respondent, but does believe that because assessments have been
ongoing for many years, and because Respondent has been
maintaining roads and open spaces, and because property owners
have been paying assessments to the SSD and to respondent since
dissolution of the SSD, Petitioner's claim must fail. Clearly,
the covenants touch and concern the land. Petitioner's
predecessors in interest benefitted from those roads and open
spaces. Petitioner benefits from the work of the Association. It
is clear that Deseret's intent was for the roads and open spaces
to benefit the subsequent property owners of the subdivided
property. As stated above, vertical privity exists.
Nevertheless, even if there was no vertical privity, as a matter
of equity, the court agrees with Respondent that prior
predecessors in interest have treated the covenants as covenants
that run with the land and so must Petitioner. A challenge to
these covenants over thirty years later is untimely and must be
barred.
(3) Property law does not fully govern here, but contract
principles emerge and where Petitioner bought the land with
notice it did so subject to certain restrictions, Petitioner
ought to be bound by those restrictions. Prior to subdividing
the property Deseret recorded the plats and CCRs. The initial
transfer from Security Title was granted in 1975. This was
several years after the plats and CCRs were recorded.
Petitioner's predecessors in interest paid the assessments and
enjoyed the roads and open spaces as a result thereof.
Petitioner has also had the right to enjoy the roads and open
spaces. There is no dispute that Petitioner had notice of the
15
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restrictions at the time it received the property. Moreover,
Petitioner took the property by quit claim deed from Grabowski
who took the property "[s]ubject to easements, restrictions and
rights of way appearing of record. . . . " For Petitioner now to
claim that those restrictions should not apply to it is not
persuasive. The restrictions were recorded long before
Petitioner obtained title. It would be inequitable to permit
Petitioner, while enjoying the fruits of such restrictions, to
not comply with the restrictions when Petitioner had notice of
them at the time it obtained title.
(4) Petitioner claims ownership of a lot of land conveyed
by Deseret. At the same time Petitioner claims that CCRs created
by Deseret do not apply to Petitioner. As discussed in (1), (2)
and (3), the court does not agree.
Based on the above, the court DENIES the motion for summary
judgment of Petitioner and GRANTS the motion of Respondent for
summary j udgment.
Respondent is to prepare an order in compliance with URCP,
Rule 7(f).
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